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ABSTRACT
Together we can achieve things that we could never do on our own. In fact, there are
sheer endless opportunities for producing morally desirable outcomes together with
others. Unsurprisingly, scholars have been finding the idea of collective moral obliga-
tions intriguing. Yet, there is little agreement among scholars on the nature of such
obligations and on the extent to which their existence might force us to adjust existing
theories of moral obligation. What interests me in this paper is the perspective of the
moral deliberating agent who faces a collective-action problem, i.e., the type of reason-
ing she employs when deciding how to act. I hope to show that agents have collective
obligations precisely when they are required to employ ‘we-reasoning’, a type of rea-
soning that differs from I-mode, best-response reasoning. More precisely, two (or
more) individual agents have a collective moral obligation to do x if x is an option for
action that is only collectively available and each has sufficient reason to rank x highest
out of the options available to them.
INTRODUCTION
Together we can achieve things that we could never do on our own. In fact, there
are sheer endless opportunities for producing morally desirable outcomes together
with others. Unsurprisingly, scholars have been finding the idea of collective moral
obligations intriguing. Yet, there is little agreement among scholars on the nature of
such obligations and on the extent to which their existence might force us to adjust
existing theories of moral obligation. More ‘revisionist’ scholars are of the view that
individual agents who are not (yet) in any way organised can hold obligations as a
group (Held 1970; May 1992; Wringe 2005; Wringe 2010; Isaacs 2011). Others ar-
gue that individual agents can share moral obligations or hold them jointly
(Bjo¨rnsson 2014; Pinkert 2014; Schwenkenbecher 2013; Schwenkenbecher 2014;
Bjo¨rnsson forthcoming). More ‘conservative’ approaches insist that there is nothing
so special about collective obligations but that individual agents may simply be re-
quired to work towards collective outcomes sometimes (Collins 2013; Lawford-
Smith 2015). There is great diversity amongst existing views and this taxonomy is a
rough one. However, I will not concern myself with the differences between these
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views now—I have done so elsewhere (Schwenkenbecher 2018) and it is not essen-
tial to my argument here.
What interests me in this paper is the perspective of the moral deliberating agent
who faces the kind of collective-action problem that motivates the above-mentioned
views, i.e., the type of reasoning she employs when deciding how to act. I hope to
show that agents have collective obligations precisely when they are required to em-
ploy ‘we-reasoning’, a type of reasoning that differs from I-mode, best-response rea-
soning, as I shall explain below. More precisely, two (or more) individual agents
have a collective moral obligation to do x if x is an option for action that is only collec-
tively available (more on that later) and each has sufficient reason to rank x highest
out of the options available to them.
Note that this enquiry is concerned with collective obligations of agents who are
not (yet) organised as a group1 and do not form what some scholars call group
agents (List and Pettit 2011; Tollefsen 2015). As such, the focus is on relatively sim-
ple actions that require coordination, but not complex organisation.2
The paper will proceed as follows: section (1) introduces two motivating cases;
section (2) explains the ideas of ‘we-reasoning’ and ‘collectively available options’;
(3) shows how ‘we-reasoning’ can yield results that ‘I-mode reasoning’ does not yield
and suggests that all of the above-mentioned accounts implicitly assume that moral
agents should we-reason. Section (4) argues that two agents have a collective obliga-
tion if they have conclusive reason to pursue a collectively available option, and sec-
tion (5) deals with potential objections.
1. TWO COLLECTIVE RESCUE CASES
The cases motivating most discussions of collective obligations are characterised by
joint necessity.3 This is a feature of actions (and outcomes) that cannot be performed
(or produced) by one person on their own, but require at least two people in order
to be realized. Joint necessity is analytic where it is part of what it means to do x that
x is done by at least two people, as in ‘getting married’. It is circumstantial where, as a
matter of fact (but not as a matter of principle), an action (or outcome) cannot be
performed (or produced) by one person alone, for instance, if it takes two or more
people to lift a heavy object.
Further, the cases motivating accounts of collective obligations tend to be collec-
tive rescue scenarios where individual agents must spontaneously collaborate in order
to assist someone in urgent need. I will be using two such cases to motivate my
argument.
The first is a two-person strict joint necessity case (more about that term in a
moment).4
Hikers: Two hikers encounter a third while hiking in a remote area. The third
hiker is trapped underneath a fallen tree. In order to free the trapped hiker, the
two others must collaborate and lift the tree together. None of them can do it
individually, but together they can. If they do not lift the tree, the trapped per-
son is likely to die. There is no one else to help.
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Most people—including both revisionist and conservative scholars—agree that the
two hikers have duties to do something about the morally dire situation; that they
have duties to assist the person in need.5 How to properly account for this basic intu-
ition is what the above-mentioned approaches disagree on.6
Hikers is a strict joint necessity case. This means that all available helpers are nec-
essary for the joint action to succeed or the joint outcome to be produced. It takes a
minimum of two people to lift the tree and there are exactly two people to help.
This differs from wide joint necessity cases, where there are more available helpers
than minimally required, as in my second example:
Commuters: On a busy weekday morning a man gets trapped between a com-
muter train and the station’s platform. He will be crushed should the train
move. Dozens of people who happen to be on the platform witnessing his pre-
dicament join forces in pushing the train to tilt it away from the man.
Together they manage to free him, therewith saving his life.7
Again, I am assuming that there is general agreement that the trapped man ought to
be assisted by the people nearby (or else that we can easily fill in enough details for
this case to generate such agreement). In each of the two cases, the morally best out-
come is only collectively available. And it is this outcome that—ideally—the
bystanders should pursue over and above individually available outcomes. In order
for this to be the case, the collectively available outcome must be an option that
would reasonably be considered by the individual deliberating agents.
In the following, I will explain how there is a special kind of reasoning involved in
choosing collective options, which I call ‘we-reasoning’ and which competes with
‘I-reasoning’ in joint necessity scenarios.
2 . WE-REASONING EXPLAINED
I am using the term ‘we-reasoning’ in a specific way here, which is inspired by but not
identical to how this and related concepts (such as team-reasoning) are used in different
theories of team agency (Gold and Sugden 2007; Sugden and Gold 2007; Hakli, Miller
et al. 2010; Tuomela 2013) and in nonstandard game theory (Bacharach 1999; Butler,
Burbank et al. 2011; Butler 2012).8 Let me explain what I mean by ‘we-reasoning’
(henceforth used without single quotation marks).
I will call we-framing the act of identifying collectively available options and in-
cluding them when deliberating about which option is best.9 We-reasoning succeeds
we-framing and consists in determining individual strategies or action choices. When
an agent we-reasons, she decides what she needs to do in order to bring about the
collective outcome she has identified as optimal.
In nonstandard game theory and theories of team agency, we-reasoning is seen as
explaining both cooperative behaviour in situations that resemble prisoners’ dilem-
mas (PD) and optimal choices in coordination games like stag hunt and the ‘hi-lo’-
game (Bacharach 1999; Hakli, Miller et al. 2010; Butler, Burbank et al. 2011).
The most general way of explaining the concept is this: agents regularly face
choices where the outcome of their action will depend on how others choose. There
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are two fundamentally different ways in which we can try to optimize the outcome
of our choices while ignorant of how the other person chooses. We can think of our
choices as best responses to the other’s choice (I-reasoning) or we can think of our
choices as contributions to the best possible collective outcome or pattern (we-reason-
ing). Let me illustrate the difference by using a simple coordination game: Hi-lo.10
Hi-lo is a coordination game with two equilibria,11 whereas one is Pareto-optimal12
and one is not. Here is the payoff-matrix for a two-player hi-lo game:
It is assumed that both players know the payoffs and that both players know that
both players know the payoffs.13 So there is some shared knowledge and some (low)
level of common (de dicto) knowledge between players, but their individual choices
are made independently. It is also assumed that players (if rational) strive for the
maximum payoff. If you are player 1, there are two different ways in which you can
think about your options. If you think of them as best responses to the other’s
choices, then you will reason in the following way: “If I think you will choose B then
the act it’s best for me to choose is B, and if you think I will choose B then it’s best
for you to choose B . . .” (Bacharach 2006, 44). This approach, however, does not
deliver any clear indication that you should select A over B. In fact, because the best-
response approach produces a conditional recommendation, it does not give you any
clear indication on how you should choose if you want to maximize your payoff
(Hakli, Miller et al. 2010).
Alternatively, you can start by identifying the best outcome and reason backwards.
For each of you, maximizing your payoff is only possible if the other player makes
the corresponding choice. In that sense, it is an outcome you can only achieve to-
gether. Michael Bacharach argues that players faced with hi-lo type scenarios in fact
regularly start their deliberation with the question “what should we do?” rather than
“what should I do?” It is in this sense that, according to Bacharach, they we-reason
about their choices: they do not approach their choices as best responses to other
players’ choices, but in terms of the best collectively achievable outcome.
Most, if not all of us would instantly choose option A over option B in the above
game. The abovementioned scholars contend that this is best explained by assuming
that players use this different mode of thinking: framing the problem as one for the
group and selecting one’s individual strategy (or option) accordingly.14
One might object by pointing to two alternative explanations15 for selecting A:
First, agents may choose A as a matter of maximising expected utility. This objection
is best countered by pointing to the fact that the we-reasoning explanation is meant
to hold in other strategic interaction cases, too, where expected-utility considerations
Table 1. Payoff-matrix for two-player hi-lo game.
Player 2 A B
Player 1
A Hi/Hi 0/0
B 0/0 Lo/Lo
Hi > Lo > 0
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will not deliver the Pareto optimal solution; for instance, it can explain the coopera-
tive choice in a prisoners’ dilemma (Bacharach 2006, Gold and Sugden 2007).
Second, is the choice not explicable by a simple preference transformation, that is,
by the suggesting that agents have a preference for the best group outcome? The
short answer to that is ‘no’ and it is perhaps best to point to the work of Hakli,
Miller et al. (2010) who draw a useful distinction between what they call pro-group I-
mode reasoning and we-mode reasoning (‘we-reasoning’ in my terminology).16 In pro-
group I-mode, agents “select actions that, given their expectations of other agents’
actions, best satisfy their preferences, which are group-regarding . . .” (Hakli, Miller
et al. 2010, 299ff). Pro-group I-mode thinking cannot eliminate the Pareto-inefficient
equilibrium in the hi-lo game. In general, “the we-mode tends to create more collec-
tive order than the pro-group mode: It can decrease the amount of equilibria but it
cannot increase them” (Hakli, Miller et al. 2010, 306). Only the we-mode guarantees
that the Pareto-optimal equilibrium be chosen in games like the hi-lo game (ibid.).
According to Hakli, Miller et al., in the I-mode the individual agents can only select
strategies, but in the we-mode agents adopt the point of the view of the group and
can therefore select outcomes (ibid., 298).17 We-reasoning is not a type of preference
transformation (where individual preferences are no longer self-regarding, but group-
regarding), but it constitutes a kind of agency transformation.18 This idea of agency
transformation is central also to Bacharach’s work (2006) and echoed in Butler et al.
(2011). For the purpose of this article I will assume that people do sometimes reason
in this different mode and that work in experimental economics shows this as a mat-
ter of fact (Butler, Burbank et al. 2011, Butler 2012).
While the preceding paragraphs served to explain we-reasoning in the context of
strategic interaction, let me now return to how I will be using the term in this article.
The first obvious departure from that context is that I am interested in strategic
moral interaction scenarios.19 The other difference is that I am not only interested in
scenarios where agents make their decisions independently. I will come back to this
point later.
I use the term we-reasoning to mean the type of moral reasoning where agents in
considering their options for acting choose ‘collectively available’ options over indi-
vidually available options. We-reasoning about moral options—as I understand it—
requires, first, we-framing the moral problem one is faced with and, second, choosing the
appropriate individual action(s) for realizing a collectively available option. Now,
whether or not it makes sense for an agent to we-reason in a given situation will de-
pend on their epistemic position, amongst other things.20
I believe that this approach to understanding joint necessity problems is particu-
larly helpful and in fact more so than alternative approaches. Further, it is helpful for
thinking about moral obligations more generally. This latter issue, however, will not
be discussed in this paper.
3. WE-REASONING IN COLLECTIVE RESCUE CASES
Returning to our first collective rescue case, Hikers, our basic intuition is that both
hikers should approach the trapped man and try to lift the tree. But how do agents
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make choices in such scenarios? Each hiker in our hypothetical scenario might reason
in the following way:
• I have two options: I can contribute to lifting the tree or not. The first option only
produces a morally desirable outcome if the other hiker cooperates. The second
option produces the less desirable but more secure outcome of a continued hiking
experience.
• Therefore, if the other hiker cooperates in lifting the tree, then I have an obligation
to contribute to lifting the tree.21
• Until and unless the antecedent of this conditional is fulfilled, I have no actual obli-
gation to do anything about the trapped man (this is assuming that nothing I could
individually do would help him).
This would be an example of moral I-mode reasoning about options for moral action
and moral obligations. The individual agent reasons about what is best given what
others do. However, with regard to the trapped man, such reasoning will yield only
conditional obligations. This generates at least two problems: that of deadlock (each
of us will help only if the other helps) and the problem of mutual release (both do
nothing therewith simultaneously denying the antecedent of each conditional obliga-
tion).22 There have been elaborate attempts in the literature to overcome these
issues by developing more sophisticated accounts of I-mode obligations for joint ne-
cessity cases (Goodin 2012; Collins 2013). The solution offered by authors like Bob
Goodin and Stephanie Collins has been to produce more complex conditionals.23
I do not want to outright reject this picture of how we do (and possibly should)
reason in joint necessity cases—and I lack the space here to directly address the indi-
vidualist approaches described above. But I believe they give only part of the story
and telling the other crucial and regularly overlooked part will make understanding
these cases much easier.
It seems to me that when faced with joint necessity cases, moral agents regularly
we-reason about their options. This is an empirical point and while I know of no em-
pirical study focusing on moral decision making and we-reasoning, the results from
studies conducted in behavioural economics and evolutionary biology on nonmoral
decision making seem to support this view and I can see no principled reason why
these results should not apply to moral deliberation (Bacharach 2006; Butler,
Burbank et al. 2011; Butler 2012; Tomasello 2014).
To illustrate this point, let us look at how an agent faced with a strict joint neces-
sity problem like Hikers would reason in we-mode.
• There are three options: We can lift the tree together, we can each go our way or
one of us can try to lift it on their own. Clearly, the first option is the best from a
moral point of view.
• I should play my part in making it the case that we lift the tree.
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Instead of reasoning about her individual choices as best responses to the other per-
son’s choices (that is, as strategies,) the hiker reasoning in we-mode considers indi-
vidually and collectively available options. My contention is this: if both agents have
reason to engage in this kind of deliberation then they have a collective pro tanto
obligation.
Note that my enquiry is limited to discussing such pro tanto obligations, because
in order to make claims about collective all-out obligations, one would have to com-
mit to a concrete normative theory. I am interested in the nature of plural obligations
as such, rather than any specific substantive version thereof. However, I am confident
that the view I put forward is compatible with several first-order normative theories.
Before moving on, let me further defend the plausibility of the proposal I just
made. Consider this quick test for how we approach joint necessity cases: Our indi-
vidual difference-making ability in a scenario such as Hikers depends on the other
person’s willingness and ability to contribute. But do we consider the other’s willing-
ness to help as part of the circumstances, that is, a given aspect of the situation, or
do we treat their willingness as something that is not-yet-fixed, flexible, and that we
could potentially change? I believe it is a mistake to primarily focus on our individual
difference-making ability in explaining why we consider the option of helping the
trapped man. An awareness of our collective difference-making ability explains better
why we would consider the option to jointly assist in the first place. If an agent takes
the collective difference-making ability as her starting point, she will not consider the
willingness of the other to be merely part of the circumstances. For instance, most
people would think it necessary in situations like Hiker to convince the second per-
son to assist if they were unwilling to do so or hesitant, rather than take their unwill-
ingness as a mere given. Most people would also think that we must not wait until
the other has indicated their willingness to collaborate but that we each must be pro-
active by indicating our willingness. This seems to suggest that, regularly, the starting
point of our reasoning process in such scenarios is what is collectively achievable. In
other words: we-frame and we-reason.24
Let me now illustrate how this process would look for a wide joint-necessity case
like Commuters. In the case of the commuters pushing a 20þt train aside, there is no
strict, but only wide joint necessity: there are more people present than necessary for
achieving the desired outcome.25 In other words, if everyone contributes the out-
come is overdetermined.
Let us assume that it is known to the individual agent that this is the case. What
they do not know is how many people are willing to help tilt the train. In this case,
each individual agent when reasoning in pro-group I-mode is fully justified in think-
ing the following:
• I have two options: I can contribute to pushing the train aside or not.
• If sufficiently many others are willing to (and do) contribute then adding my con-
tribution is not actually helping to produce the outcome. It is superfluous and
makes no difference to the outcome.
• If an insufficient number of people contribute, then:
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• If even when adding my contribution we still fall short of the required minimum
number of contributions then my contribution makes no difference or, in other
words, it is not the best response to the choices of others. Or
• If my contribution is the one contribution needed to help cross the threshold of
minimally necessary contributions then it will make a difference, or, in other
words, it is the best response to the others’ choices.
• Only in the last case does my action secure the best outcome and is the best re-
sponse to the others’ choices.
• It is not clear whether or not I have an actual obligation to contribute to freeing
the trapped man (this is assuming that nothing I could individually do would help
him) and it is very difficult for me to find out (since I do not know the exact num-
ber of people willing to contribute and the number of those who are necessary).
Further, it is unlikely that I will be the difference-maker.
• Also, since my contribution is not necessary for producing the desired outcome, it
would never be my failure to contribute which undermines the joint cause. After
all, my failure to contribute could always be compensated by any of the other
undecided or unwilling agents.26
The problem is, of course, that this kind of I-mode reasoning about her obligations is
available to every single commuter on the platform. If everyone deliberates in this
way, they may very well fail to rescue the trapped man for no other reason than be-
cause they are uncertain about their obligations or for arguing—correctly (!)—that
they are not uniquely causing the joint effort to fail.
One might now contend that this is not how we would actually deliberate in a
scenario like Commuters. I think that many (though probably not all) of us would
reason quite differently. The flaws of the approach above are effectively avoided by
we-reasoning. Individual commuters might deliberate along the following lines:
• There are three options: A sufficiently large subgroup of us push against the train
together and succeeds in tilting it, or we all go our way, or some of us try to tilt the
train even though our numbers are insufficient for making a significant difference.
Clearly, the first option is the best from a moral point of view.
• I should take steps towards realising the first option (e.g., by encouraging others to
push against the train with me).27
I hope this shows how the counterintuitive implications of I-mode reasoning are ex-
acerbated in wide joint-necessity cases. Likewise, I hope that this example lends plau-
sibility to the idea that we could be required to participate in collective endeavours
merely because it is the right thing to do, not because we are definitely making a dif-
ference to the outcome.
Let me now unpack my proposal—that agents have collective obligations pre-
cisely when they should employ we-reasoning—a little more. What does it mean to
say that agents should engage in this kind of deliberation? I will answer this question
using Christopher Woodard’s notion of group-based reasons (2003; 2011). To say
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that agents should we-reason is to say that they should give preference (or greater
weight) to group-based reasons over individual-based reasons.
In the Commuters case, when the individual commuter notices that a man is
trapped between the train and the platform, she can quickly conclude that help can
only be provided collectively. But do others appear willing and ready to contribute?
In many wide joint-necessity cases we have insufficient information on how many
others are willing and ready to contribute. Do I have reason to contribute even if
there is no overwhelming evidence of others contributing? Woodard defends the fol-
lowing claim:
[A] pattern of action by the group is capable of providing a reason to perform
a constituent part of the pattern, so long as the group could perform this pat-
tern of action—where that means that each member could play her part.
(2003, 225)
A group-based reason to participate “would be provided by the consequences of the
group action, of which the participation is only a part” (2003, 216). He explains that
[T]he idea is not that there is a reason to perform A because it will bring about
P, or make P more likely. Instead it is that the goodness or rightness of P pro-
vides reasons to perform its parts, just in virtue of their being parts of it. (2011,
263)
Woodard rejects the idea that the others’ willingness as such is decisive for the exis-
tence of a group-based (or, as he later calls it, pattern-based) reason. Rather, such
willingness will impact on the strength of one’s group-based reason (2003, 2011).
According to Woodard:
[A]n individual can have a group-based reason to participate in a group action
even when no other member of the group is willing to cooperate. This makes
it possible for group-based reasons to conflict properly with individual-based
reasons, and so increases their interest. (2003, 216)
The conflict between individual-based reasons and group-based reasons Woodard
describes is precisely the conflict between I-reasoning and we-reasoning that is
expressed in the different perspectives that the hikers and the commuters in our
examples can take, as portrayed above. In other words, when we-reasoning about
moral obligations, a deliberating agent will put emphasis on pattern-based or group-
based reasons for acting in a particular way. When I-reasoning about moral obliga-
tions, a deliberating agent will emphasize individual-based reasons for acting in a par-
ticular way.
This means that I may have reason to we-frame and we-reason even if I do not
know anything about the other persons’ actions or decisions. Think, for instance, of
a modified Hikers case: as part of an experiment, two people find themselves in sepa-
rate rooms without being able to communicate to each other, each facing a red but-
ton. They are each being told that there is another person in another room, who is
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being given the same information: if both of them press the red button then a person
who is trapped elsewhere under a log will be freed. If they both fail to press the but-
ton then the person will remain trapped and will most likely die. I hope that most
people would think it is obligatory to press the red button, despite the fact that we
do not know what the other one will do. Let me spell this out for the sake of clarity:
each of the two agents has reason to consider the collectively available option as best
(each pressing the button), they each have reason to include it in the set of options
over which they deliberate, and they have reason to take corresponding steps to-
wards realizing that option, namely pressing the button in front of them.
Often we will not need to have positive confirmation of what another person is
doing and of whether they are contributing in order to justifiably we-reason about
the problem at hand. We often (are required to) we-reason about our obligations un-
less we have reason to believe that the other(s) will defect (Lawford-Smith 2012; Aas
2015).28 At other times, I believe, we may be required to we-reason only if we have
reason to believe that others will cooperate.
There is no simple criterion for deciding whether to privilege we-reasoning over
I-reasoning. This may seem unsatisfyingly vague, but I believe that any attempt to
once and for all settle this matter in the abstract is bound to fail. It seems to me that
much will depend on context and, furthermore, it will often be a matter of discre-
tion.29 However, where joint actions or jointly produced outcomes are part of our
regular behavioural repertoire, agents should we-reason per default, e.g., when setting
the table for dinner or helping to lift a pram into a bus.
Five things should be noted at this point. First, more needs to be said on the cru-
cial question of when we use and should use each type of reasoning and when we are
justified or required to abandon we-reasoning for I-reasoning. I will do so in the next
section. Second, as I said earlier, the claims I have defended so far are not tied to any
particular normative moral theory. In particular, when I speak of morally desirable or
best options this need not be read in a consequentialist way. It could be that the best
option is the one which entails respecting someone’s autonomy.30
Third, and relatedly, this enquiry is limited to exploring pro tanto moral obliga-
tions, rather than all-out moral obligations. We may say that the individual commuter
has a pro tanto obligation to contribute to tilting the train even where she is uncertain
whether sufficiently many others will do so or even where she knows that they will
not. Whether or not it becomes an all-out obligation, depends on her knowledge of
others’ willingness to contribute, but also on competing normative claims and obliga-
tions. Further, it depends on which normative ethical theory is correct. Fourth, there
might be a worry that the argument here leads to a proliferation of collective obliga-
tions and makes us positively responsible for an endless number of desirable out-
comes that we could in principle collectively achieve. I will address this problem in
the last section.
Fifth, to clarify: we-reasoning is reasoning at the individual level. This will be the
only kind of reasoning possible in many scenarios where collectively available
options are best, but the group of agents is large or dispersed, with very limited op-
portunity for potential helpers to communicate, discuss options, and choose joint
strategies. However, there are also cases where in order to address a joint-necessity
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problem agents need to directly communicate, develop a joint strategy, and distrib-
ute individual tasks, sometimes repeatedly and over a sustained period of time. This
may often take the form of group-based reasoning (Sugden and Gold 2007; Hakli,
Miller et al. 2010). However, in this paper, I am mainly interested in those cases
where agents have to make their choices independently or with very little informa-
tion on how the others choose or where only minimal group-based reasoning is
required.
4 . WHEN TO WE-REASON ABOUT OUR MORAL OBLIGATIONS
Presumably, the reader will grant the empirical point that in scenarios where the con-
tributions of two or more agents are jointly necessary in order to produce a morally
desirable outcome, we sometimes reason from the top down, so to speak, starting
with the most desirable option even though that option is not available to us in the
way that individually achievable options are available to us. Potentially, the reader
will even grant the normative point, that we-reasoning might sometimes be a require-
ment of rationality or morality or both. But the obvious question is when should we
engage in which kind of reasoning? While I said above that it is difficult to give a sim-
ple answer to this question, I will nonetheless try to say more about the circumstan-
ces under which we ought to we-reason. The answer to this question is crucial for
my argument, because I claim that deliberating in I-mode often yields different
results concerning our moral obligations than deliberating in we-mode.
At this point, a more fundamental problem needs to be discussed, namely
whether or not the process of moral deliberation is or is not independent of what
our actual moral obligations are. In other words, whether or not in deliberating about
our moral obligations we are merely discovering (or failing to discover) what moral
obligations we (objectively) have. I am talking about the difference between objec-
tive, subjective, and prospective views of moral obligation (Zimmerman 1996).
According to the first, what we ought to do is ultimately independent of what we
(can) know and even if we act on the best information available and are meticulously
scrupulous in our decision making, we may still be violating our actual obligations.
Moral deliberation serves to get us as close as possible to finding out what our—ob-
jective—obligations are. According to both the subjective and prospective view, our
obligations depend on what we know or believe to be true (subjective view) or what
we should know or believe to be true if we are conscientious and avail ourselves of
the evidence (prospective view) (ibid.).
It seems to me that if we are objectivists about moral obligations, the idea of col-
lective moral obligations as obligations that people hold together or jointly reduces
to the question of what is—as a matter of fact—morally best or optimal (however
moral optimality is understood, that is, according to the normative ethical theory
one endorses). We-reasoning can then be seen as the most adequate deliberation
method, since it requires each agent to consider collectively available options. On
this view, we-reasoning can help us discover what is in fact morally best, where I-rea-
soning can make us fail to see that.
However, this is not the route I wish to take here. Rather, I propose to turn this
argument on its head: Instead of assuming that our obligations (collective or
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individual) are imperatives to produce morally optimal outcomes (or perform mor-
ally optimal actions for that matter), I suggest that what agents are morally obligated
to do is to produce what they reasonably believe to be the best available outcome,
given they have conscientiously investigated the options.
This picture disagrees with the objective view of moral obligations and I am aware
that this move requires justification. Since I am not able to discuss the (de)merits of
the objective view here, I will point to Michael Zimmerman’s critique and respective
rejection thereof.31 Zimmerman’s main objection to that view is that it yields coun-
terintuitive results in some scenarios with incomplete knowledge (2014, 30ff).32
Further, if the subjective view of moral obligation were correct then agents’ collec-
tive obligations would depend on what each individual agent believes to be morally
best in a given set of circumstances, regardless of whether she has good evidence for
that belief. Zimmerman rejects this view, mainly because it would render conscien-
tious enquiries into the correctness of one’s beliefs meaningless (2014, 26ff).
In contrast, on the prospective view, which he proposes and develops, what matters
is what evidence there is and whether this evidence supports the belief regarding
one’s obligation (2014, 64). According to Zimmerman, this is “the best bet regarding
the actual values at stake” (2014, 34).33
My argument here aligns with a prospective view of moral obligations. That is, it
makes sense only if we think moral obligations depend on what the individual delib-
erating agent can know, provided they are conscientious. If that is how we approach
the issue of moral obligations then, I believe, some of the core propositions of exist-
ing accounts of collective obligations are more easily explained. On the subjective
view, e.g., it is harder to justify the demand that agents should try to find out if the
other is willing to cooperate, that is, to demand that agents collect evidence. On an
objective view, it makes less sense to argue that one’s beliefs concerning the other’s
willingness to cooperate impact on one’s duties (as in Lawford-Smith [2013]). I am
not suggesting that existing accounts of collective obligations have in fact endorsed
the prospective view. I suspect that many of them implicitly rely on an objective view
of moral obligation (Wringe 2005; Collins 2013; Pinkert 2014; Schwenkenbecher
2014) or else oscillate between different views (Lawford-Smith 2012; Lawford-Smith
2015). But I believe that the prospective view can best make sense of—and in fact
simplify—such accounts or some of their core features, at least.
With Zimmerman, I believe that agents should avail themselves of evidence as
part of discharging their moral duties. Taking his view one step further, I also hold
that this means to recognize that others require evidence for their own moral deliber-
ation, that one is often in a position to provide relevant evidence, and that one
should in fact provide it, especially when faced with joint necessity cases.34
This takes me back to our main issue and the one the reader has been waiting to
hear about: When should agents we-reason about their obligations? When are we jus-
tified in abandoning we-reasoning for I-reasoning (or even be required to do so)?
Remember that I am claiming that agents have obligations together (or jointly) with
others precisely when they should we-reason about their options. Tying this back to
what I said earlier: two (or more) agents have collective moral obligations precisely
when they should act on group- or pattern-based reasons.
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As I said before, I will leave aside the question of what substantial, ethical theory
is correct. For the sake of argument, let us assume that people agree on what consti-
tutes moral optimality.35 If the prospective view is roughly correct, then agents
should we-reason when the collective option is their best (moral) bet given the evi-
dence. If both agents are equally in a position to view the same problem in the same
way, and if to the conscientious agent pattern-based reasons outweigh individual-
based reasons then both become the joint subject of a collective obligation, that is,
they jointly hold that obligation.
In Hikers, the two potential rescuers have a collective obligation if each has con-
clusive reason to privilege the joint activity over individual activities. This implies
that the joint activity is in fact available, which is easily established: each individual
hiker can avail herself of evidence concerning the other hiker’s ability and willingness
to contribute. If they both have this evidence instantly, for example, where both sig-
nal their willingness to contribute instantly, then the collective obligation to assist
the trapped man is instantaneous.
What if one of the hikers is not willing to contribute or does not indicate their
willingness to the other? Her unwillingness may stem from a lack of evidence, e.g.,
evidence for the optimality of the collectively available option. In that case she may
not have to we-reason and there is no collective obligation. Another possibility is
that the evidence is there, but she fails to avail herself of it—she fails to take it in
(perhaps in a negligent way) and as a result fails to act (perhaps she simply walks
away from the scene). In this case we could possibly say that the hiker should have
been aware of the optimality of the collective option and that there was a collective
obligation on her and her counterpart even if she did not realize it. Her epistemic fail-
ure and lack of due care led to a moral failure.
Importantly, even in the first case where the oblivious hiker is not to blame for
her ignorance of the optimality of the collective option, the other hiker can generate
a collective obligation by providing her with the evidence and indicating her willing-
ness to contribute. We often can (and regularly do) generate joint obligations with
others in this way: “Hey, you, could you come over here and help me with this?” is
all that it sometimes takes. If one of the two hikers refuses, despite evidence that a
collective option is available and best, then she may be individually blameworthy for
the joint failure to rescue the trapped man, since it is a strict joint necessity case (see,
e.g., [Schwenkenbecher 2014]).
What if they cannot agree on how to go about carrying out the joint activity—a
scenario discussed by Virginia Held (1970)? Held describes this as a case where the
collective remains responsible for the failure to assist, but the individuals are absolved
from responsibility. On my view, such absolution would depend on the evidence
they had and the complexity of the task. However, these issues are difficult if not im-
possible to determine in purely the abstract.36 Sometimes, a collective task is too
complex to be accomplishable by a random congregation of agents. In such cases,
there may be no collective obligation on the agents, because they lack joint ability.
Or they may have an obligation to transform themselves into the kind of collective
that can successfully address the task at hand (May 1992; Collins 2013). In other
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cases, the task may be perfectly doable, but the chance of a coordination failure still
high enough to excuse the agents for failing to perform it.
Summing up what has been said so far, we arrive at the following sufficient condi-
tions for collective obligations:37
Two or more moral agents jointly hold an obligation to perform an action or
produce an outcome corresponding to a collectively available option under the
assumption that each agent, if she is conscientious,
i. has reason to believe that the collectively available option (e.g. joint rescue)
is morally best;
ii. has reason to include that option in her deliberation about her obligations
(we-framing the problem);
iii. has reason to deduce her individual course of action based on (i) and (ii)
(we-reasoning about the problem) and the ability to do so;
and the agent
iv. has no overriding obligations, is not unduly burdened by the task, and is
jointly capable with the other(s)38 of discharging the task at hand.
Steps (i–iii) may take place consecutively or simultaneously. Further, (ii) and (iii)
will usually (but not necessarily) involve some communication between the potential
collaborators. This can be nonverbal communication. For instance, if I see the other
person lay hands on that fallen tree in an attempt to remove it then I usually have a
reason as per (ii) and (iii). Likewise, if I see lots of other people push against the
train to tilt it, then I have reason as per (ii) and (iii).
We can now see that our two exemplary cases had a few implicit assumptions on
which the initial plausibility of the claim that the passers-by and bystanders should
jointly assist rests. Namely that rescuing the person is indeed best overall39 and that
this is obvious to each person.40 The main question that had scholars worried was
how to conceptually account for two issues: (a) that at time t1, when each agent is
first confronted with the moral problem, she does not know if there are enough
others willing to assist, in other words, whether there is joint ability, and (b) that the
success of securing the best option does not depend on her alone, that is, that the
potential duty of rescue cannot be neatly allocated to a specific agent.
My account has mitigated each problem: It proposes that two (or more) agents
hold duties collectively when they each have reason to consider the collective option
best, to include it in their set of options, and to actually take steps towards acting on
that option. They will regularly have reason to do so when the collective activity is a
contextually given default position or where they have some positive indication of
willingness to cooperate from the other agent(s). The latter case includes those cases
where one person takes the lead and distributes tasks.
If they fail to we-frame the situation or to we-reason about their individual
actions, they make a mistake in moral deliberation (which may or may not be excus-
able). Flawed reasoning can sometimes still yield the right result. But if agents fail to
collaborate as a result of flawed reasoning they violate a moral obligation. This is no
different for individual duties, except for one aspect: if we accept that agents can
164  Collective Moral Obligations
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
onist/article-abstract/102/2/151/5374570 by M
urdoch U
niversity user on 12 M
arch 2019
hold moral obligations jointly with others it looks like I may be on the hook for your
flawed reasoning. Let me briefly comment on this issue. If we accept that obligations
are held jointly in some joint-necessity cases then it seems that automatically each
agent who is part of the obligation has some reason for ensuring the obligation is dis-
charged and for correcting others’ flaws in moral reasoning. This to me seems to be
a good thing. If I recognize that we ought to jointly save the trapped man by lifting
the tree and you fail to see that (without good reason) then I should make an effort
to convince you.
Further, let us suppose that I fail to get you to acknowledge what you should ac-
knowledge, namely that we jointly ought to help the trapped man. We might say that
the resulting failure to act on our duty to help him is a joint failure. That is, the
wrongdoing involved in failing to rescue the man is joint wrongdoing. But we need
not commit to making a similar claim about blameworthiness. It seems perfectly in-
telligible to say that we jointly failed the trapped man and you are to blame.
Admittedly, this question needs further scrutiny. Unfortunately, I do not have the
space to discuss this here, but will instead point to my earlier discussion of this issue
(2014).
5. PROBLEMS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
Let me finally address five further qualifications of and potential objections to the
above-sketched account of collective obligations.
First, it might be objected that sometimes we (need to) make moral decisions
very quickly and cannot go through the steps indicated above. Often, so the objec-
tion goes, we have no clear idea about exactly how many people are necessary in or-
der to complete some collective task, how many of those around are willing to help,
and whether the task is doable at all, but we nonetheless get to work and make a
start. I agree that this is often how we approach collective tasks, but this does not un-
dermine my argument. The above steps will often take place simultaneously or not
be explicitly followed at all. They constitute, of course, an idealized account of moral
reasoning.
Also note that if we make decisions very fast we often get things wrong. Picking
the collective option (and we-reasoning about the problem) may sometimes be our
first impulse, but it may not be the best bet. Depending on the circumstances we
may or may not be excused for getting it wrong. Further, our social and cultural con-
ditioning, of course, impacts on our reaction to joint-necessity cases and other collec-
tive moral action problems. For some, picking a collective option (and acting on it)
may be an almost instinctive response, whereas for others in the same situation it is
not. We have different aptitudes for recognizing collective moral action problems as
problems for ‘our group’. To what extent these different aptitudes and the impact of
social factors should be reflected in our ethical theories is a topic for another paper.
Second, one might want to insist that regardless of whether it turns out that we
are actually able to help the trapped person, each of us is under an obligation to ap-
proach the person and to make an effort to lift the tree even if the other potential
helper is doing nothing. According to this objection, we should first and foremost try
to help, even if it is pointless. There seems to be something morally wrong about not
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even trying even if the other person clearly does not want to collaborate. And if
we grant this point then does this not suggest that first and foremost we have an—
individual—obligation to try to assist?
I believe that the idea that we should try to assist regardless can be explained in a
way that does not undermine my argument. In my view, the appeal of this idea rests
on the intuition that we should try to find out if we have individual ability to lift the
tree. It would be odd indeed, given what is at stake, to not even investigate that pos-
sibility. We ought to explore our options, where these are not obvious at first glance,
especially in cases of great urgency with a high potential for significant moral loss. In
other words, rather than suggesting that really we only have individual obligations to
try to assist in a joint necessity case like hikers, the intuition that we ought to do
something even if the other does not cooperate points to an epistemic duty to investi-
gate, which we may have even where we are objectively powerless to assist.
Third, it is important to note that there will be more complex and less urgent col-
lective tasks, which require more detailed elaboration of individual action choices
than individual-based we-reasoning can achieve. These cases are not covered in the
account presented here. Where group membership is relatively stable and communi-
cation possible, potential collaborators may (need to) discuss different options to-
gether in a way that is best described as team-reasoning (Sugden and Gold 2007;
Hakli, Miller et al. 2010). This process happens at the level of the group and requires
certain epistemic conditions to be in place.41
Fourth, one might nonetheless wonder what the advantage of my view is over in-
dividualist views, when, in fact, it might appear more complicated than those.
However, it is important to distinguish between what may be called ‘basic’ individual-
ist views and more sophisticated accounts such as Stephanie Collins’s for instance
(2013). The view proposed here is in fact simpler than Collins’s.42 Further, it is an
advantage of a collectivist approach that it can explain and justify the emergence of
individual contributory obligations in joint necessity cases in a way that individualist
accounts cannot (Wringe 2016). Further, it can deliver unconditional obligations
and it avoids many of the counterintuitive implications of the individualist view, as
discussed in section three.
Fifth, there might be a worry that the argument here opens the floodgates to a
multitude of collective obligations for pretty much anything that we could in princi-
ple achieve collectively—which is a lot. In other words: does this approach not lead
to a morality that is overly demanding? But note that this worry is misguided, since I
only discussed pro tanto collective obligations. Whether or not any specific set of in-
dividual agents have such joint obligations, does not merely depend on their ability
to effect positive change in the world, but on what their evidence gives them reason
to act on. By contrast, one might believe that the view proposed here makes the no-
tion of collective obligations impotent. This objection, however, fails to acknowledge
that most of us are already acting on collective obligations, that is, for group-based
moral reasons. Many of us who reduce our carbon footprint, who reduce their meat
consumption, or who simply vote in a general election think of our actions in terms
of contributing to or playing our part in a collective obligation. After all, when we
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justify acting in ways that make no discernible difference to a desired outcome we
tend to invoke pattern-based reasons for our choices.43
NOTES
1. Agents will count as organised or nonorganised always with regard to a specific goal. That is, a group
may be organised with a view to producing x, but may be unorganised with a view to producing y. My
colleagues and I are organised as a university department for the purposes of teaching and administra-
tion, but we are not organised for the purpose of holding a political rally (as a political activist group
would be) or building a house (as a building firm would be). Even though we could perhaps organise to
do those things, they are not activities embedded in the current structure of the organisation. Hence,
with regard to that (alien) activity, we count as nonorganised.
2. This means that certain issues are outside the scope of this enquiry. For instance: when should we form
an organised group in order to resolve a morally urgent problem? However, that the issue of forming an
organised group raises the exact question discussed here: when do individuals who are not (yet) organ-
ised in a group have an obligation to do so (and how do they know)?
3. I am adopting the term joint necessity from Holly Lawford-Smith (2012), adding the distinction between
strict and wide, as well as that between analytic and circumstantial joint necessity.
4. Variations of this scenario abound in the literature on collective agency and responsibility (Held 1970;
Cullity 2004; Lawford-Smith 2012; Collins 2013; Schwenkenbecher 2013; Schwenkenbecher 2014;
Wringe 2016), to name only a few. In all of these scenarios, a person’s life is threatened and it takes at
least two people to avert the threat.
5. In both cases a lot is at stake, the need for action is urgent, and it is within our capacity to help. Even
though the argument that if we can produce something morally valuable at little cost to ourselves then
we are morally obligated to do so has been most prominently made by utilitarians (Singer1972), all ma-
jor moral theories would agree with the gist of this conclusion.
6. More precisely, they disagree on how we should conceptualize the idea that two agents together ought
to produce a morally optimal outcome. ‘Revisionists’ claim that collections of two or agents can hold
obligations as a group or together even if they do not form a group agent in the strict sense.
‘Conservatives’ argue that individuals (only) have individual obligations to promote morally optimal out-
comes in such cases.
7. This happened in Perth, Australia, on 5 August 2014. See http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-06/
man-freed-after-leg-trapped-in-gap-on-perth-train-station/5652486. A similar event occurred in Japan the
year before: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/22/tokyo-train-passengers-rescue-woman-
trapped. See also: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼39i89NJNCRQ. Both accessed on 22 Feb 2017.
8. For a short explanation of the origins of the concept of team reasoning see Robert Sugden (2015, 152).
9. I am using this term differently from how, e.g., Butler et al. use it (2011, 2012).
10. Let me add a quick comment on using the decision-theoretic tools of game theory in ethics. Our moral
decision making can concern problems that are structurally similar to the scenarios studied in game the-
ory, including coordination problems or prisoners’ dilemmas. Therefore, I believe it is fruitful to adopt
the concept for our purposes with one (important) caveat: traditionally, the study of strategic interaction
focuses on scenarios where individual agents make their choice(s) independently of one another. In real
life, and in the moral decisions it imposes on us, this is often not the case.
11. “A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies such that no player can improve her payoff by changing her
strategy, given the strategies of the other players.” (Reiss 2013, 58). In other words, if player 1 chooses
‘A’ (or ‘B’) then player 2 cannot improve her payoff by choosing anything other than ‘A’ (or ‘B’). She is
best off choosing the same strategy given the other’s strategy.
12. (A/A) is optimal in that there is no solution that leaves one of the players better off while leaving the
other one at least not worse off. (B/B) is not optimal, because there is a solution that would make both
players better off.
13. This is usually an implicit, not an explicit assumption. In prisoners’ dilemma narratives, e.g., both suspects
are being told the same story, so the payoffs are at least shared knowledge between. Further, it is usually
assumed that each prisoner knows that the other knows these payoffs and vice versa.
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14. The concept of we-reasoning is meant to improve classic game theory in at least three ways: (1) It rede-
fines what a rational choice is for individual players, allowing the cooperative choice in one-shot prison-
ers’ dilemmas to be rational, (2) it allows us to better predict players’ choices, (3) it explains why players
make those choices.
15. These are merely the two most obvious alternatives. There are other possible explanations, e.g., that play-
ers might be pursuing a maximax strategy.
16. Confusingly, Hakli, Miller et al. (2010) use the term ‘we-reasoning’ for both pro-group I-mode reasoning
and we-mode reasoning.
17. Hakli, Miller et al. say that “a group agent can in a sense select outcomes” (2010, 298). I think this is mis-
leading, as we-mode reasoning is employed by individuals. Framing the situation as one for the group
and choosing individual actions accordingly will not require a group agent. Nor does acting together nec-
essarily transforms a group of individuals into a group agent (Pettit and Schweikard 2006).
18. According to some authors, we-mode reasoning involves forming a collective intention (Hakli et al.
2010), that is, an intention with regard to the action (to be) performed by the group as different to the
intention concerned with the action (to be) performed by the individual. Gold and Sugden (2007) con-
cur that the modes of reasoning behind the ‘we-intentions’ people form when cooperating differ from
those behind ‘I-intentions’. Collective intentions, in their view “are the product of a distinctive mode of
practical reasoning, team reasoning, in which agency is attributed to groups” (2007, 137). However, we-
mode reasoning does not necessarily involve the forming of collective intentions, at least not if such
intentions are thought to require interdependent beliefs about others’ intentions. In cases like the ‘hi-lo’
game and the PD it is neither necessary nor likely that agents have no interdependent beliefs about
others’ intentions.
19. It is, of course, perfectly compatible with game theoretic analysis that the players’ preferences are of
moral nature. In that case, the highest payoffs correspond to the morally best outcome.
20. Numerous factors may impact on how an agent frames a given scenario, including their level of identifica-
tion with the group, their previous experiences with spontaneous collaboration, or contextual cues as to
the social expectations of the given situation.
21. Assuming that I have an obligation to produce morally desirable outcomes.
22. Another problem is this: If they fail to free the trapped man and continue on their hike, the wrongness of
failing to save him would not seem to go over and above the wrongness of failing to contribute to saving
him. If there is no obligation to save him (as there is no appropriate subject of such an obligation) then
no one can be blamed for having failed to save him. This seems counterintuitive (see Schwenkenbecher
2014). Further, and perhaps more controversially, the I-mode approach seems to challenge our moral
phenomenology (see Wringe 2016).
23. While I am not able to argue for this in any detail, I should point out that I am not convinced that Bob
Goodin solves the problem. He rightly shows that simple conditional commitments are not enough even
if both are committed to the maximally ethical action. “I will lift the tree if you will” does not commit
them to acting unilaterally and satisfying the conditional (Goodin 2012). Goodin’s solution is to argue
that individuals must commit to the following conjunction of two conditionals: I will if you will and I will
if (you will if I will). This solution does not escape the problem of failing to match our intuitions. If you
and your friend fail to lift the tree and free the trapped man you have each failed in a duty to contribute
to that action, not in a duty to perform that action. Further, how do I as a deliberating agent know that
you will contribute if I will contribute? We may not be able to find out (e.g., if we cannot directly com-
municate) in which case, on Goodin’s account, we either would not have an obligation to contribute or
not know whether we do. I believe that my alternative Hikers scenario shows, contra Goodin, that we
may have an obligation regardless.
24. It may be tempting to ascribe collective obligations and obligations to we-reason whenever a collective
outcome is optimal, but I approach the problem via the perspective of the agents who find themselves in
such situations. The view defended, therefore, commits me to a nonobjective view of moral obligations
(see Zimmerman 2014).
25. I thank Matthew Kopec for pointing out the importance of this case for my argument.
26. This marks the difference between wide joint necessity cases, like Commuters, and strict joint-necessity
cases like Hikers. For the former, each agent is correct in arguing that her refusal does not uniquely un-
dermine the collective endeavour.
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27. This reasoning reflects the case of the commuters where there is no certainty as to exactly how many
people are required to help and decisions have to be made fast. This will often be the case in rescue sce-
narios, but not in other collective assistance contexts. Where there is the opportunity to discuss decisions
yet other, more sophisticated, forms of collective reasoning may occur instead.
28. In contrast, Derek Parfit seems to have suggested that we only have reason to act as a member of a po-
tential group if we know that enough others are contributing (Parfit 1984).
29. This means that sometimes we may not be able to establish whether a set of agents really did have a col-
lective moral obligation to produce some outcome or action.
30. For a discussion of this issue, see Zimmerman (1996).
31. In Zimmerman’s own words: “. . . if one should ever be so fortunate as to know which of one’s options
actually is best, then the verdict issued by the Prospective View is the same as that issued by
the Objective View. . . . It is only when ignorance regarding the relevant empirical or evaluative
facts enters the scene that a gap may emerge between what is actually best and what is prospectively
best” (2014, 92).
32. It should be noted that Zimmerman rejects the idea of collective obligations (1996), but there is no rea-
son why those who do not share his scepticism cannot endorse his analysis of moral obligations.
33. Zimmerman uses a case by Frank Jackson, which has a doctor provide a partial cure to a patient even
though a complete cure is available and the doctor is aware of that. In this case, there is not enough evi-
dence for the doctor to distinguish between the drug causing a complete cure and one causing certain
death (Jackson 1991). However, there is clear evidence for which drug provides the partial cure, and the
doctor—rightfully in Zimmerman’s view—gives the patient the latter despite knowing that it is not the
best option (Zimmerman 2014, 30). Zimmerman points out that on the objective view she has acted
wrongly.
34. This explains the obligation to signal one’s willingness to cooperate to other agents.
35. One might object that since people in fact disagree on substantive moral issues my account of collective
obligations never gets off the ground, since it requires people to agree on what matters (most) morally.
But I disagree: we can perfectly well speak about individual moral obligations in an abstract manner with-
out adopting a specific substantive view, so this move should be available for discussing collective obliga-
tions, too.
36. One recent suggestion to determine this in the abstract is Pinkert’s (2014) proposal that scenarios trig-
gering collective obligations are those that have one salient solution, where it is clear what needs to be
done collectively and what each individual needs to do (immediate joint ability) or where this can easily
be established (mediate joint ability). His proposal shares features with mine, but is, I believe, (implicitly)
committed to an objective view of moral obligations.
37. These conditions are jointly sufficient for collective obligations. Plural obligations can also arise without
joint necessity, that is, in cases where one person alone can produce a desirable outcome, but as a matter
of fairness the burden of producing it should be distributed amongst several people. These types of cases,
however, are not discussed here.
38. What exactly it means for two or more agents to be jointly capable of doing something (performing an
action or producing an outcome) is another issue deserving more detailed discussion, which I provided
elsewhere (Schwenkenbecher forthcoming).
39. For the cases discussed, this assumption was made more plausible by the fact that all major moral theo-
ries and common sense morality would converge on the judgment that rescuing someone’s life at little
cost to oneself is morally obligatory.
40. Other features that support the plausibility of an instant duty to collectively assist are epistemic simplicity
(it is obvious what the solution to the problem is and what the contributory roles involve, it is clear that
the problem needs a quick solution, that others are willing to help and agents can communicate effort-
lessly) and moral simplicity (it is a one-off effort, posing a negligible burden on helpers, and there are no
competing duties).
41. Sometimes it is assumed that team reasoning requires common knowledge (Gold and Sugden 2007).
However, I believe that some lower-level group knowledge may suffice.
42. On Collins’s account, the passers-by in our collective rescue cases would have duties to collectivise, that
is, duties to work towards forming a group agent, which then acquires a duty to perform the rescue
action. The duty of the group agent entails contributory duties for group members. Her five criteria for
collectivization duties (CCD) are as follows:
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(1) u is morally pressing, and (2) at t1, either: no (collective or individual) agent/s have duties, either
to u?or to take responsive actions with a view to there being the morally desirable outcome that u pro-
duces; or too many agent/s with such duties default, and (3) if, at t1, A, . . . , N each took responsive
steps towards there being a collective-that-can-u then, at t2, that collective would incur a duty to u, and
(4) at t1, A, . . . , N are each able to take responsive steps towards there being a collective-that-can-u at
a reasonable expected personal and moral cost, and (5) other individuals will not successfully take re-
sponsive steps towards there being a collective that will incur a stronger duty to u.
If these are met then
(6) at t1, A, . . . , N each has a duty to take responsive steps towards there being a collective-that-can-u,
and (7) at t2, once a {A, . . . , N} collective-that-can-u is formed, that collective has a duty to u, which
entails (8) at t3, once the collective has distributed u-related roles, each member with a u-related role has
a duty to perform that role. (Collins 2013, 244).
See also my discussion of Collins’s account in Schwenkenbecher (2018).
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